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Book Reviews I international Relations 
to parts of the world yet to embrace republican politics at 
home. Instead, Deudney closes with a somewhat esoteric 
reflection on "nuclear one worldism." 
These shortcomings notwithstanding, Bounding Power 
is destined to become a classic work of IR theory, blend 
ing with remarkable innovation and insight he long tra 
dition of republican theory with the field's more familiar 
paradigms. 
All Politics Is Global: Explaining International 
Regulatory Regimes. By Daniel W. Drezner. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007. 234p. $29.95. 
DOI: 10.1017/Si 537592707072672 
- David P. Fidler, Indiana University 
Daniel Drezner begins his book by throwing down a 
gauntlet: "Globalization is responsible for a lot of bad 
international relations theory" (p. 3). This assertion caused 
this reviewer to nod in agreement, but it heightened my 
expectations for what Drezner would produce. These 
expectations grew as he identified promulgators of "bad 
international relations theory," which ranged from com 
mentators, such as Thomas Friedman, to schools of inter 
national relations theory, including realism and liberal 
institutionalism, but especially theories that privilege the 
agency of nonstate actors in world politics. By and large, 
the author met this reader's expectations by crafting a
rigorous, robust, and accessible analysis of international 
regulatory regimes. 
All Politics Is Global has a simple structure. In Part I, 
Drezner constructs a "revisionist" heory of international 
regulatory regimes. In the first hree chapters, he announces 
his intent o bring the great powers back into the analysis 
of global governance, develops a theory of regulatory out 
comes that supports privileging the great powers, and 
provides a typology of global governance processes to 
demonstrate that regulatory outcomes differ from regu 
latory processes. 
In Part II, the author explores four case studies to test 
how well his theory explains them in comparison to other 
theories: global governance of the Internet (Chapter 4), 
the international financial system (Chapter 5), genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) (Chapter 6), and intellec 
tual property rights and public health (Chapter 7). In the 
final chapter, he summarizes his arguments, discusses his 
theory's limitations, and speculates about how changes in 
international relations may affect international regulatory 
regimes in the future. 
Drezner's salvo against bad IR theory makes his theo 
retical efforts worthy of heightened scrutiny. His theory 
explains why "[a] great power concert is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for effective global governance over 
any transnational issue" (p. 5). This state-centric, power 
oriented approach rejects other interpretations of global 
ization, which have intergovernmental organizations 
860 Perspectives on Politics 
(IGOs) or nonstate actors (e.g., nongovernmental orga 
nizations) primarily shaping regulatory cooperation. Unlike 
realists, Drezner takes account of IGO/NGO participa 
tion in international regulatory politics. Similarly, follow 
ing liberalism, he argues that domestic actors and 
institutions determine state preferences, even those of 
the great powers, rather than the anarchical structure of 
international politics. 
Initially, Drezner's theory sounded as though he had 
merely visited the IR theory buffet able and taken the bits 
he liked best. But does it represent a coherent heory? This 
question highlights the importance of his "theory of reg 
ulatory outcomes," which he develops using game theory 
models. (For the mathematically oriented, the author pro 
vides an appendix describing proofs for his propositions.) 
His theory building explains 1) how state preferences flow 
from domestic alculations of economic adjustment costs 
created by different outcomes in regulatory cooperation, 
and 2) why the market size of the great powers alters the 
nature of outcomes over such cooperation. 
Drezner carefully defines his terms, and he defines the 
"great powers" in international regulatory cooperation as 
the United States and the European Union, based on their 
respective market sizes and reduced vulnerabilities toexter 
nal disruptions (pp. 35-36). The great power concert that 
is necessary and sufficient for effective global governance 
depends on how U.S. and EU preferences align. Drezner 
acknowledges that the countries that qualify as great pow 
ers can change, and that changes, such as China's contin 
ued rise, could make international regulatory cooperation 
increasingly difficult (p. 219). 
After constructing his model, the author argues that it 
is "unaffected by the introduction of new actors" (p. 63). 
In assessing the impact of IGOs or NGOs, he distin 
guishes regulatory outcomes, which the great powers deter 
mine, from governance processes, which can involve state 
and nonstate actors. For Drezner, the key to separating 
outcomes from processes is the great powers' ability to 
"forum shop" for governance processes conducive to achiev 
ing the outcomes they want (p. 63). This approach leads 
to his "typology of regulatory coordination," which pre 
dicts four regulatory outcomes (sham standards, rival stan 
dards, club standards, and harmonized standards) based 
on the divergence among 1) the great powers' interests 
and 2) the great powers' interests and those of other inter 
national actors (p. 72). 
Drezner tests his model in four case studies, which ana 
lyze the development of harmonized standards (e.g., gov 
ernance of Internet technical protocols), club standards (e.g., 
international financial standards), rival standards (e.g., data 
privacy and the Internet; GMO regulation), and sham stan 
dards (e.g., regulation of Internet content) predicted by the 
typology of regulatory coordination. He concludes that his 
model explains international regulatory regimes better than 
competing frameworks (see particularly Table 8.1, p. 207). 
Though not surprising asa conclusion, the quality and rigor 
of his analysis are impressive, certainly impressive enough 
to avoid being labeled bad IR theory. 
The "semideviant" case that challenges his theory, 
Drezner concedes, involves the controversy over the World 
Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and Public Health 
(see Chapter 7, pp. 176-203). He admits that arguments 
that global civil society (GSC) activism shifted the great 
powers' positions in the adoption of the Doha Declara 
tion on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Nov. 
2001) "cannot be summarily dismissed" (p. 184). 
Although Drezner mounts an alternative explanation, I 
wondered, on the one hand, whether he conceded too 
much to GCS arguments, which indicated the power of 
his analysis in the other case studies. On the other hand, I 
sensed that the TRIPS case revealed things Drezner did 
not discuss. He counters the GCS explanation of the Doha 
Declaration with arguments that draw on the great pow 
ers' security concerns about HIV/AIDS and worries about 
the impact of September 11, 2001, on the WTO's future 
(pp. 184-94). What jumps out is how the ideas and mate 
rial actions of nonstate actors (GCS groups and terrorists) 
and transnational phenomena (epidemic disease, global 
terrorism, and GCS activism) affected the great powers' 
approach to international regulatory cooperation in ways 
not well captured by Drezner's state-centric, power 
oriented theory. Read in this light, the case study is more 
than "semideviant" because it contradicts the assertion that 
the introduction of new actors does not affect he great 
power concert. 
The author's claim that such a concert is a sufficient 
condition for effective global governance over any trans 
national issue invites the hunt for other incidents that 
might confound the theory. The insufficiency of a great 
power concert to produce a badly needed international 
regulatory regime on the sharing and exploitation of avian 
influenza virus samples might constitute a stronger "devi 
ant" case than the Doha Declaration. Drezner's recogni 
tion of his theory's limitations (pp. 207-8) suggests, 
however, that he welcomes critical scrutiny of the ideas he 
has impressively added to the body of IR theory. 
Delegation and Agency in International 
Organizations. Edited by Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, 
Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney. 424p. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006. $80.00 cloth, $34.99 paper. 
DOI: 10.1017/Si537592707072684 
- Tim Bithe, Duke University 
This volume examines and exemplifies the usefulness of 
principal-agent (P-A) theory for the study of international 
relations through a set of well-integrated analyses of del 
egation to international (governmental) organizations 
(1Os). The editors begin with some useful, explicit defini 
tions of key terms. They define delegation as a revocable 
"grant of authority" from one or more "principal(s)" to an 
"agent," which enables "the latter to act on behalf of the 
former" in a specified omain and/or for a limited period 
of time. The agent's discretion in how to pursue the 
principal's objectives is a direct inverse function of the 
precision of the rules laid down by the principal. Agent 
autonomy, by contrast, is defined as the possible range of 
actions the agent can take contrary to the principal's inter 
ests, net whatever mechanism the principal may have put 
in place to control the agent. To the extent that an agent 
actually pursues his own interests contrary to the principal's, 
we see agency slack. 
Ten substantive chapters then use this common termi 
nology to adapt and extend P-A theory to analyze various 
specific ases of delegation to 1Os, including the Inter 
national Monetary Fund (J. Lawrence Broz and Michael 
Hawes, Erica R. Gould, Lisa L. Martin), multilateral devel 
opment banks and aid agencies (Mona Lyne, Daniel Niel 
son, and Michael Tierney, Helen V. Milner), the European 
Union Commission and Parliament (Mark A. Pollack), 
the World Health Organization (Andrew P. Cortell and 
Susan Peterson), the United Nations Security Council 
(Alexander Thompson), international courts and the World 
Health Organization's Appellate Body (Karen Alter, Andrew 
P. Cortell, and Susan Peterson), and the Commission and 
Court under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Darren Hawkins and Wade Jacoby). 
One of the general insights from this volume is that 
P-A theory travels well from domestic to international 
delegation, across a wide range of issue areas. The same 
set of expected benefits motivate delegation, and cost or 
difficulty of monitoring increase agent autonomy, for 
instance in Gould's analysis of the IMF, just as for domes 
tic agents. 
So is there anything that makes international delega 
tion distinctive? Some of the authors suggest that there 
is. Cortell and Peterson, for instance, argue that lOs-as 
agents are more likely to have preferences that differ from 
those of the member states when the IO has a staff of its 
own rather than a staff seconded from national bureaucra 
cies. David A. Lake and Mathew D. McCubbins, in their 
concluding chapter, suggest hat the importance of infor 
mation provision by third parties with the requisite xper 
tise for keeping lOs-as-agents accountable creates incentives 
for states to retain specialized bureaucracies at the domes 
tic level, even if most of their policymaking functions 
have been delegated internationally. There is no func 
tional equivalent for this duplication in domestic delega 
tion, which also suggests that international delegation may 
tend to be less efficient. 
Another difference arises from Lyne, Nielson, and Tier 
ney's distinction between an agent with multiple princi 
pals and an agent with a "collective principal," consisting 
of a group of otherwise independent actors who jointly 
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